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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I n t h e M a t t e r of 
COUNTY OF RENSSELAER, 
Responden t , 
- a n d -
RENSSELAER COUNTY UNIT OF THE RENSSELAER 
COUNTY LOCAL 842, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
MARVIN I. HONIG, ESQ. (GORDON R. MAYO, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (WILLIAM F. REYNOLDS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County of 
Rensselaer (County) to the determination of the hearing officer 
that it imoroperly instituted a procedure for the inspection of 
" 1 
employee parcels. The County acknowledges that it instituted the 
procedure, but defends its conduct by the assertion that it was a 
management prerogative for it to do so. This defense was rejected 
by the hearing officer. 
X The hearing officer dismissed the second specification of the 
charge which alleged that the County altered work schedules. 
There are no exceptions to this part of the decision. 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4146 
Board - U-4146 -2 . 
Facts 
On July 9, 1979, the County instituted a parcel inspection 
procedure, at Van Rensselaer Manor, a nursing horae facility. Under 
the procedure, employees were required to obtain advance written 
permission to leave the premises with a parcel. The written per-
mission would be completed in duplicate. One copy of it would be 
forwarded to the security office and the second copy would be kept 
by the employee. Upon leaving the building, the employee would 
give his copy of the permission to a security guard who would 
compare it with the original. The security guard could inspect 
any parcel in the possession of the employee and the employee is 
prohibited from refusing such inspection. It is implicit in this 
prohibition that an employee who would not cooperate with the 
security guard would be subject to disciplinary action. The 
hearing officer so found and there are no exceptions to that, finding. 
The inspection program was not directed at the protection of 
the property of residents of the nursing home. Its purpose;was.. 
to prevent pilferage of County property and to discourage employees 
from bringing personal property to..work. 
The hearing officer found that ":[tj]he inspection or search 
procedure...has but incidental effect on the public interests 
served by the County" and that an employee's failure to comply 
would be reason for disciplinary action. On these facts, he 
concluded that the institution of the inspection procedure was a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
In its exceptions, the City argues that the hearing officer's 
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conclusion is in error. It further argues that, even if the 
hearing officer was. correct, the collective agreement in effect 
at the time of the institution of the inspection procedure autho-
rized the County's unilateral action. Specifically, it relies 
upon the management rights clause which it claims to constitute a 
waiver of any current right that the charging party, Rensselaer 
County Unit of the Rensselaer County Local 842, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc. , Local LWO, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) , 
2 
may have to negotiate the matter further. 
Discussion 
Ife affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law of 
the hearing officer. 
The Duty to Negotiate. 
The parcel inspection procedure is a work rule which affects 
terms and conditions of employment. In determining whether a work 
rule is a mandatory subject of negotiation, the Board must strike 
a balance between an employer's freedom to manage its affairs and 
the right of employees to negotiate their terms and conditions of 
2_ The management rights clause provides: 
"Section 1. Except as otherwise specifically 
provided in this Agreement, the employer shall 
have the customary and usual rights, powers and 
functions to direct the employees, to hire, 
promote, suspend and to take disciplinary action, 
and to otherwise take whatever actions are ... 
necessary to carry out the mission of the 
Employer pursuant to existing practices unless 
altered by this Agreement." 
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employment. Whether or not the work rule is enforceable by 
disciplinary penalties is a factor to be considered in determining 
the extent that the rule affects terms and conditions of employ-
4 
ment. 
Considering the work rule and its enforcement as one, we 
determine that it has a substantial effect on terms and conditions 
of employment. It discourages employees from bringing personal 
property to work and it subjects them to searches and to disci-
pline, and is designed to protect the County's property. Applying 
the appropriate balancing test, the hearing officer concluded 
that the interests of the employees predominated. 
We agree with the hearing officer and find persuasive sup-
port for his conclusion in a decision of the NLRB in Boland Marine 
& Manufacturing Co., 228 NLRB No. 173; 94 LRRM 1743 (1977). In 
that case, the NLRB dealt with an employer's unilateral institu-
tion of a parcel inspection program which is similar to the one 
before us and was also designed to prevent the theft of its equip-
ment. The NLRB found that conduct of the employer to violate its 
duty to negotiate changes in conditions of employment. -, '.:":." 
3_ In Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia v. NLRB, F2d_ 
89 LC 112,207 (August 13, 1980), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia said: 
"[W]hen there is a conflict between an employer's 
freedom to manage his business in areas involving 
the basic direction of the enterprise and the right 
of employees to bargain on subjects which affect the 
terms and conditions of their employment, a balance 
must be struck, if possible, which will take account 
of the relative importance of the proposed actions 
to the two parties." (footnote and citations omitted). 
4 Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia v. NLRB, supra. 
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Satisfaction of the duty to negotiate 
Having determined that the County's unilateral action in-
volved a mandatory subject of negotiation, we must consider its 
defense that, by agreeing '-to': the contractual management rights 
clause, CSEA waived its right to negotiate as to a parcel inspec-
tion program during the life of the contract. Here, the manage-
ment rights clause authorizes the County inter alia to discipline 
employees as necessary "to carry out the mission of the Employer 
pursuant to existing practices...." As it does not cover the 
institution of new procedures, it does not constitute a waiver 
of any right that CSEA has to negotiate as to them. We find 
nothing anywhere in the contract that deals with the subject of 
the newly instituted procedure. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the County of Rensselaer to dis-
continue the inspection program herein described, 
as initiated by its order of July 9, 1979, and 
to post a notice in the form attached at all 
locations that are ordinarily used to communicate 
with its employees. 
Dated, Albany, NY . 
October 17, 1980 / $ W & ^ 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
ZL^ Jd&~^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
524 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees, that: The C o u n t y o f R e n s s e l a e r 
hereby rescinds i t s order dated July 9, 1979 
establ ishing a package inspection procedure 
a t ' t h e nursing home. 
. CD.UNXY. 0.E. RENSSELAER.. 
Employer 
Dated. By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
NEW YORK, INC., 
Respondent, 
-and-
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Cha rg ing P a r t y . 
#1B-10/17/8G 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4543 
RICHARD HARTMAN, ESQ. (RONALD J. DAVIS, ESQ., . 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
RAINS & POGREBIN, ESOS. (PAUL J. SCHREIBER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
The City of New Rochelle (City) charged the Police Associ-
ation of New Rochelle, New York, Inc. (Association) with a viola-
tion of its duty to negotiate in good faith in that it submitted 
to interest arbitration seven demands involving nonmandatory sub-
jects of negotiation. The Association responded that each of the 
seven demands constituted a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Determining that two of the demands involved nonmandatory subjects 
of negotiation, the hearing officer ordered the Association to 
withdraw those demands. The Association filed no exceptions to 
this part of the decision. The remaining five demands were deter-
mined by the hearing officer to be mandatory subjects of negotia-
tion and she dismissed the specifications of the charge relating 
to them. This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City, 
which asserts, that the hearing officer erred in her determination 
that the five demands involved mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
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The first of the demands deals with an aspect of employee 
disciplinary proceedings. It provides: 
"The Hearing Officer for disciplinary proceedings 
shall be selected from a list supplied under the 
rules of the American .'Arbitration Association, the 
cost of the Hearing Officer selected to be borne 
equally by the City and the Association. The 
Hearing Officer shall judge the guilt or innocence 
of the Employee charged and if guilty, the punish-
ment." 
The hearing officer determined that this demand is covered by the 
rationale of the courts in Auburn Police Local 195 v. Helsby, 
62 App.Div. 2d 12, 11 PERB 1(7003 (3rd Dept., 1978); aff'd 46 NY2d 
1034, 12 PERB 117006 (1979), which holds that employee discipline 
is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
In its exceptions, the City argues that Auburn is inapplic-
able for two reasons. First, it argues that in' Auburn, the courts 
dealt with procedural matters concerning which Civil Service Law 
§75 permitted alternatives while the demand herein is for the 
substitution of arbitration for an exclusive statutory procedure. 
Second, it argues that in Auburn, the employees were given a 
choice of either the contractual or statutory disciplinary pro-
cedure, while here, they are not. 
Neither-argument is persuasive. By its terms, Civil Service 
Law §75 is no more exclusive in determining who should hear 
disciplinary charges than it is in the other procedural particu-
lars that were at issue in Auburn. Indeed, the court supported 
its conclusion by citing decisions which held that matters of 
employee discipline could be submitted to arbitration. In Antinore 
v. State of New York, 49 AD2d 6, 9 PERB 117528 (1976), the Court held that an 
Board - U-4543 
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employee need not be .given.the opportunity to choose between 
statutory and contractual disciplinary procedures. It said that 
a recognized or certified union may, in the course of reaching an 
agreement with an employer, waive rights of employees to resort to 
the statutory disciplinary procedures. 
The "second demand deals with work related benefits and rules 
It provides: 
"Employees who are required or requested to use their 
personal car for department business shall be entitled 
to, in addition to any other fee or wages received, 
twenty-five cents per mile from their -residence to 
the location and back to their residence. Members 
shall be permitted to sign in and out by telephone 
call to the Desk Officer." 
In its exceptions, the City directs our attention to the 
second sentence of the demand. It argues that the demand is not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation because it would interfere with 
its administrative supervision of its employees. In support of 
its position, it cites several decisions of this Board in which 
we ruled that demands that a public employer relinquish adminis-
trative supervision of its employees are nonmandatory. These 
decisions are inapposite. Here, the employer wishes to reserve 
to itself the right to have employees going on special assignments 
appear at the office before commencing their assignments, while 
the Association demands that the employees be given instead, the 
right to call in by telephone at that time. The Association's 
proposal would change the procedure by which the City's admin-
istrative control of its employees' attendance could be exercised. 
It would not eliminate the City's basic control over attendance or 
require the City to relinquish that control to the employees. As 
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a general proposition, an administrative work rule constitutes a 
mandatory subject of negotiation unless it has but a slight impact 
upon terms and conditions of employment or if it has a major impact 
upon managerial responsibilities that, by law or public policy, 
may not be shared. Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, F.2d , 89 LC 
U'12,207 (D.CCirc, 1980). The work rule involved in this demand 
meets that basic test. Its clear and direct major impact is on 
conditions of employment and not upon essential managerial respon-
sibilities. The work rule here is similar to the use of time 
clocks as a check upon the hours worked by employees, and the NLRB 
has held that the institution of time clocks is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. Nathan Littauer Hospital Association, 229 NLRB 
1 
No. 166, 95 LRRM 1296 (1977). 
The third demand is that the City institute a voluntary 
physical fitness program. It provides: 
"The City shall institute, on voluntary partici-
pation by the individual employee, a physical 
fitness program." 
The employer argues that the demand is not a mandatory sub-
ject of negotiation because employee participation would be 
voluntary. This argument is not persuasive. The availablity of 
a fringe benefit is a mandatory subject of negotiation even if not 
all employees choose to take advantage of it; Tuition re-..:.' •.;••• 
imbursement is an example of such a fringe benefit, and it has 
been held to be a mandatory subject of negotiation. Board of 
1 See also Rustcraft Broadcasting, 225 NLRB No.65, 92 LRRM 1576 
(1976) and 3NA Inc., 235 NLRB No.2, 97 LRRM 1447 (1978) in 
which the NLRB determined that an insignificant procedural 
change involving the use of time clocks did not violate the 
employer's duty to negotiate the subject generally. 
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Education of Huntington v. The Associated Teachers of Huntington, 
30 NY2d 122, 5 PERB 117507 (1972); City of Kingston, 9 PERB 1[3069 
(1976). 
The fourth demand is for liability insurance. It provides: 
"The City shall maintain an insurance policy to 
provide coverage for Employees for Torts Acts, 
Liability and False Arrest. Such coverage shall 
not"be"less than one million dollars per incident." 
Insurance is an economic benefit and a form of compensation and is 
therefore, a mandatory subject of negotiation. See Town of 
Haver straw v. Newman, 75 App.Div.2d 874, 13 PERB 1f7006 (2nd Dept., 
1980). The employer argues that this kind of insurance coverage 
is different because it would extend to off duty actions of the 
employees that are not related to on the job performance and the 
protection of unlawful civil or criminal conduct which cannot be 
protected as a matter of public policy. We find both objections 
to be without merit. In Haver straw, the court held that as an 
economic benefit, insurance coverage need not be related to an 
employee's job performance. Nor do we construe the demand as 
having the effect of absolving the employee from unlawful conduct. 
The benefit simply relieves the employee of the civil liability he 
would incur. It would not absolve him of any criminal respon-
sibility. Moreover, it would not preclude the employer from 
instituting disciplinary charges in appropriate situations. 
The last demand would •establish a •Medical Review../. . . 
Board to determine whether an employee has a job-related illness 
or injury. The demand provides: 
"There shall be a Medical Review Board to determine 
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whether an individual officer has an illness or 
injury which is job-related. Such board shall be 
comprised of a physician selected by the individual 
officer, a physician selected by the City and in the 
event that these physicians cannot agree, then a 
physician shall be selected by the mutual agreement 
of the individual's physician and the City's physician 
to make a determination." 
The City contends that the demand is nonmandatory because 
the subject matter is covered by General Municipal Law §207-c. 
That statute deals with payments to policemen who suffer job-
related injuries or illnesses. In pertinent part, it authorizes 
the employer to appoint a doctor to examine the injured or sick 
policeman to ascertain whether he has recovered and when he is 
able to work again. This statutory provision does not preclude 
the establishment of a procedure for the medical determination, 
either initially or on review, as to whether an illness or any 
injury is job-related. The General Municipal Law §207-c does not 
preclude the negotiation of such procedures any more than does 
Civil Service Law §75 in dealing with employee discipline. Sec-
tion 75•does not preclude negotiations concerning designation of 
the hearing officer who makes determinations in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Board of Education of Huntington, supra. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer, and 
Board - U-4543 
WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, 
and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
October 17, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
t^Lcis /O^LtA^d^ 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
David C. Rand ies , /Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
'
 :
 #10-10/17/80 
In t h e M a t t e r of : 
COPIAGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, \ ' B 0 A R D DECISION'AND ORDER 
R e s p o n d e n t , : 
: CASE NO. U-4297 
- a n d - : 
COPIAGUE ASSOCIATION OF PRINCIPALS, : 
Charging Party. : 
HENRY A. WEINSTEIN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BARATTA & SOLLEDER, ESQS. (GEORGE J. 
SOLLEDER, JR., ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
The charge herein alleges that the Copiague Union Free 
School District (District) violated its duty to negotiate in good 
faith with the Copiague Association of Principals (Association) 
"by reason of the (a) rejection of the agreement based on axi '..;.:'• .': 
issue npt.previously .included ,: .in. negotiations and (b) refusal to 
abide by the agreement reached...." The District denied that it 
rejected any agreement reached. On the contrary, it argued, it 
was the Association which reneged on the agreement. 
The hearing officer determined that both parties agreed that 
they had come to an agreement, but that they differed as to their 
respective obligations under that agreement. Accordingly, she 
concluded that the issue presented by the charge and answer merely 
required an interpretation of the agreement reached by the parties. 
Ruling that it is not for PERB to interpret the parties' agree-
ment, she dismissed the charge. The matter is now before us on 
exceptions of the Association to the hearing officer's decision'. 
OOtXf 
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was ever discussed in negotiations and argued that the issue of 
the guidelines was a "late starter" that the District added after 
agreement had been reached. 
There is testimony that the District insisted upon the com-
pletion of the work of the Guidelines Committee by September 1, 
1979, as a condition for the payment of any salary increase. Also 
the record suggests that the Board of Education approval of June-.27, 
1979, may have been conditioned upon the Guidelines Committee com-
pleting its work. There is contradictory testimony that the work 
of the Guidelines Committee was not a factor in negotiations. The 
hearing officer did not reach the question of which testimony she 
considered the more credible. The hearing officer noted the con-
flict in the testimony and indicated that it turns upon the resolu-
tion of the credibility of witnesses. However, because she per-
ceived the issue before her as being limited to one of contract 
interpretation, she did not resolve the credibility question. 
Discussion 
We do not accept the hearing officer's analysis that the 
issue presented in this case merely involves a difference between 
the Association and the District as to their respective obliga-
tions under a final agreement. The record shows that the District 
has denied the existence of a final agreement. This position is 
made clear by the District's July 2, 1979 letter to the Associa-
tion in which it described the agreement reached as "tentative". 
The repudiation of a final agreement is a violation of the 
1 
duty to negotiate in good faith. It is clear that if there are to 
1 c.f. NLRB v. Custom Wood Specialties, F2d , 104 LRRM 2530 
(8th Cir., 1980); Birkenwald Distributing Co., 243 NLRB No.155, 
102 LRRM 1005 (1979); Union Springs, . 6 PERB 1f3074 (1973); City 
' of New York, 8 PERB 1f3051 (1975) ;' Baldwin Sanitation District, 
8 PERB 113074 (1975). 
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Facts 
The District and the Association reached an agreement which 
originally covered the period, July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1978. On 
December 8, 19 78, the period covered by the agreement was extended 
to June 30, 1979. Pursuant to that agreement, a committee was 
established for the development of guidelines for 1980-81 salaries 
to be based upon performance. The committee was to submit the 
guidelines by June 1, 19 79. It did not meet the deadline and, by 
that date, it had ceased to function. 
In March 1979, the parties commenced negotiations for an 
agreement to succeed the one expiring on June 30, 1979. The sole 
demand of the Association was for a salary increase. The District 
made a counterproposal to the Association's salary demand, but did 
not propose any other changes in the prior agreement. 
In June 1979, the parties reached an agreement on a salary 
increase, subject to ratification by the District's Board of 
Education and by the Association's membership. It was so rati-
fied, the approval by the Board of Education occurring on June 27, 
1979. Thereafter, on July 2, 1979, the District wrote to the 
Association and advised it that the agreement was "tentative" in 
that it was conditioned upon the Guidelines Committee completing 
its work by a deadline that was extended to September 1, 1979. As 
the September 1 deadline was not met, the District refused to pay 
the salary increase. 
In defense of its conduct, the District argued to the hear-
ing officer that the significance of the work of the Guidelines 
Committee had been made known to the Association's committee and 
that the issues had been discussed during negotiating sessions. 
The Association denied that the work of the Guidelines Committee 
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be harmonious and cooperative relations between public employers 
and the organizations representing their employees, neither side 
may be permitted to repudiate its agreements. Such a repudiation, 
if it occurred here, would be inconsistent with the requirements 
of good faith negotiations. 
The record indicates, however, that there may be a dispute 
as to whether any final agreement had, in fact, been reached. If 
there was no final agreement, or if the agreement was a conditional 
one, as the District states, its refusal to acknowledge the 
Association's version of the agreement would not appear to violate 
the Taylor Law. If, however, there was an agreement in the terms 
alleged by the Association, the District's repudiation of that 
agreement would be a violation of its duty to negotiate in good 
faith. To resolve this issue, the hearing officer should take 
further relevant evidence and resolve the question of the credi-
bility of the conflicting testimony. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE REMAND this matter to the hearing officer 
for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
October 17, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
M E^j^^^^^^n^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, MeaSSer 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
: #lD~lQ/17/80 
In the Matter of : 
: BOARD DECISION AND 
CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 
; ORDER 
Upon the Application for Designation : 
of Persons as Managerial or Confidential. : CASE NO. E-0617 
LEXOW & JENKINS, P.C. (WARREN BERBIT, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for the School District 
ANTHONY D. WILDMAN, for the Clarkstovm Educa-
tional Secretaries Association and the Clarkstown 
Teachers Association 
The Clarkstown Educational Secretaries Association and the 
Clarkstown Teachers Association, which jointly intervened in this 
proceeding, have filed exceptions to a determination of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) that Joan Ryan, a secretary employed by the Clarkstovm 
1 
Central School District (District), is a confidential employee. 
In support of its application, the District submitted Joan 
Ryan's job duty statement which, among other things, specified 
that she "maintains confidential and regular correspondence." It 
also submitted an affidavit stating that Joan Ryan is a personal 
secretary to Dr. Travaglini, the Assistant Superintendent for 
1 The employer applied for the designation of five clerical 
employees as confidential. The Director granted the applica-
tion. The joint intervenor. accepts the Director's determina-
tion with respect to four of the five employees. 
A" 
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Instruction, and that her functions include the handling of confi-
dential information relating to personnel matters, collective 
bargaining negotiations, the enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreements and employee discipline. On March 27, 1980, while this 
matter was pending before the Director, the District submitted 
a supplemental affidavit. The affidavit indicated that Dr. 
Travaglini is on the District's negotiating team and that he has 
responsibilities involving employee grievances, evaluations and 
contract interpretations. The supplemental affidavit further 
stated that on March 12, 1980, Joan Ryan appeared at a negoti-
ating session on behalf of the Clarkstown Educational Secretaries 
Association and that, consequently, it has had to take "the 
extraordinary and logistically difficult, if not impossible, 
measure of advising Dr. Travaglini to bypass his secretary on all 
confidential matters." 
The joint intervenor bases its exceptions on the above-
quoted line of the supplemental affidavit. It contends that Ryan 
is not performing any confidential functions at this time and 
argues that the test for her designation as confidential is not 
whether she may be reasonably required to nerform confidential '.: 
2 
tasks, but whether she is actually doing so, 
2 In Binghamton, 12 PERB 1(3099 (1979), we noted that §201.7(a) 
of the Taylor Law provides distinct tests for the designation 
of employees as managerial and as confidential. A managerial 
employee is one who may be reasonably required to perform 
managerial functions, while a confidential employee is one who 
actually performs confidential functions. 
OOuO 
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On the evidence before us, we affirm the determination of 
the Director that Joan Ryan is a confidential employee. Based 
upon her job duty statement and the two affidavits, we conclude 
that she performed confidential services to Dr. Travaglini and to 
the District until March 12, 1.980, when she first appeared at a 
negotiating session on behalf of the Clarkstown Educational 
Secretaries Association. Thereafter, the District withheld 
Ryan's normal confidential responsibilities from her as a tempo-
rary expedient' pending the resolution of this case, which had 
already been filed before this Board. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the decision of the Director 
in this matter be, and it hereby is, 
affirmed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
October 17, 1980 
•J***+Cte>:# MtttntUi jfe^ . • 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, MemBer 
%jij*j%y 
STATE OF NEW YORK-
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the 
NASSAU EDUCATIONAL CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, UNIT #18, AND CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondents, 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 210.1 
of the. Civil Service Law. 
On June 12, 1980, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that the Nassau Educational Chapter of the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Unit #18 (hereinafter 
the Unit), had violated Civil Service Lav? §210.1 in that it 
caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and engaged in a strike 
against the Plainedge Union Free School District (hereinafter the 
District). The charge also named the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. (hereinafter CSEA) as a respondent, but solely 
because the Unit has authorized the District to remit to CSEA the 
deductions to which the Unit is entitled pursuant to Civil Service 
Law §208 and which are subject to forfeiture in this proceeding. 
The strike alleged in the charge occurred on April 14, 15, 
17 and 18, 1980. Approximately 57 employees in a negotiating unit 
of 62 custodial and maintenance employees participated in it. 
However, the absences each day were limited to the employees at 
particular work locations and no employee was absent more than one 
day. An average of 14 employees absented themselves each day. 
Because the strike was conducted in this manner, the District was 
readily able to have the work ordinarily performed by unit employ-
ees performed by part-time employees or administrators. The 
G540 
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BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE. NO/ D - 0 1 9 3 -
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strike therefore had a minimal impact on the District's 
operations. 
The respondents filed an answer but thereafter agreed to 
withdraw it, thus admitting all of the factual allegations of the 
charge, upon the understanding that the charging party would 
recommend and this Board would accept a penalty of loss of the 
Unit's deduction privileges to the extent of one third (33 1/3%) 
1 
of the amount that would otherwise be deducted during a year. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the Unit 
violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike as charged, 
and we determine that the recommended penalty is a reasonable 
one. 
WE ORDER that the deduction privileges of the Nassau Educa-
tional Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Unit #18, including any remittances therefrom by the District to 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
be suspended^ commencing on the first practicable date, and 
continuing for such period of time during which one third (33 1/3%) 
of the annual amount of dues and agency shop fees, if any, would 
otherwise be deducted. Thereafter, no deductions shall be made 
on its behalf by the Plainedge Union Free School District until 
1 This is intended to be the equivalent of a four-month 
suspension of the privileges if deductions were made 
uniformly from each payroll throughout the year. In 
fact, deductions are not made uniformly throughout 
the year. 
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the Nassau Educational Chapter of the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Unit #18 affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government as required by the provisions 
of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: Albany, New York 
October 17, 1980 
i*+444^/f< ,$*m** «. 
arold R. Newman,Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
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